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Churchill’s defeat in Dundee, 1922, and the decline of liberal political 
economy  
 
           JIM TOMLINSON 
 
                        University of Glasgow 
 
 
In 1922, after 14 years as one of the city’s two MPs, Churchill was defeated as Liberal 
candidate for Dundee.1 For Churchill this was a key moment in his personal political 
biography, the last occasion on which he stood as a Liberal candidate as he began his 
journey back to the Conservative party. It was also a key moment in the parliamentary 
politics of the city, with Churchill the last Liberal to be elected, so 1922 marked the 
final moment of the shift from a position of Whig/Liberal dominance, which had 
endured since the 1832 Reform Act, to a Labour predominance which was to last 
most of the twentieth century.2  But beyond these two particular trajectories, 
Churchill’s defeat can be used to examine a broader issue: the challenges to liberal 
political economy in Britain in the context of the First World War.3 In particular, the 
focus here is on the impact of the war on re-shaping the global division of labour and, 
above all, the difficulties in responding to the domestic consequences of this re-
shaping. 
 
Dundee is ideal for use as a basis for an examination of the links between the 
local politics and global economic changes in this period because of the traumatic 
effects of the war and its aftermath for the economic vitality of the city. That vitality 
depended to an extraordinary extent on one industry, jute, which provided directly and 
indirectly most of the city’s employment. Jute was an extremely ‘globalised’ industry.  
All raw jute brought to Dundee came from Bengal, and the markets for its product 
were scattered all over the world. But in addition, the main competitive threat to the 
industry came from a much poorer economy (India) so that jute manufacturing was 
the first major British industry to be significantly affected by low wage competition. 
Adding further complexity to this global entanglement was that India was, of course, 
part of the British Empire, so that the challenge of responding to the industry’s 
problems was necessarily embedded in imperial strategies and policies.4  
 
The war greatly accelerated the trends that were already evident in the jute 
industry well before 1914. Significant competition from jute factories in Bengal had 
been evident since the 1880s, although the Dundee industry continued to expand, 
albeit slowly, until the eve of war. The question of how to respond to this competition 
had been live in the city from that decade onwards, and many of the city’s employers 
had shifted to a protectionist stance.  But that stance had found little support in the 
wider electorate, and in 1908 Churchill had won on a strongly free trade platform, 
joining Alexander Wilkie, a Labour MP with broadly ‘Lib-Lab’ affiliations, who had 
been elected in 1906.5 
 
In the years before 1914 the Liberals had not just been a free trade party, vital 
as that was to their political identity. The ‘New Liberalism’ of those years articulated 
a combination of free trade with a significant set of interventions in the labour market 
and in social welfare, designed to attract the urban working class. On the labour 
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market side were the creation of Labour Exchanges, Unemployment (as well as 
Sickness) Insurance, and Trade Boards to set minimum wages in some sectors of the 
economy. Social welfare legislation included the provision of pensions and free 
school meals. 6 
 
Before 1914 this combination of international liberalism and domestic reform 
secured power for the Liberals, and defeated the alternative protectionist political 
economy of the Conservatives, while simultaneously limiting the gains of the Labour 
Party.7 But it came under profound pressure as a result of the First World War, with 
all the great export staples (textiles, shipbuilding, coal-mining, iron and steel) 
weakened by the impacts of the war. After a brief boom in 1919/20, their collapse 
posed compelling questions about the desirability of free trade, but also about how 
domestic policy would respond to the plight of the people in areas affected by staple 
decline.  
 
The Dundee case allows us to examine these key themes of the external and 
internal challenges to pre-war Liberal orthodoxies. In particular, debates in and about 
the city between Churchill’s victory in the 1918 election and his 1922 defeat highlight 
the difficulties of formulating answers to the new problem of low wage, imperial 
competition bringing exceptional levels of economic distress to a major industry. 
While the electoral problems of the Liberal party in these years stemmed from a 
variety of causes, not least a divided leadership and the decline of its traditional 
Nonconformist base, this article contends that there were profound problems of 
political economy that the party failed to effectively respond to.8  
 
The first section of this essay provides a summary of the city, its economy and 
politics from Churchill’s first election in 1908 to the coming of war, and the second 
looks at the impact of the war on the city. The third analyses the external aspect, 
focussing on the battle between protectionism and free trade, especially in the 
immediate post-war years. The fourth highlights the key issue of wages and their 
regulation, in the context of the mass unemployment that emerged after 1920, and the 
fifth section deals with the run up to and the 1922 election itself. The last section 
offers some conclusions on the wider implications of the Dundee case for the 
contemporary problems facing liberal political economy. 
 
     I 
 
At the turn of the twentieth century approximately 40 per cent of Dundee’s 
working  population was employed directly in the jute industry, but many more in the 
docks, on the railways, in shipping and merchanting, were involved in buying and 
selling and transporting both the raw material and the finished product.9 The term 
‘juteopolis’, used of Dundee since the 1850s, accurately described its situation: no 
other industrial city was so reliant on one sector.10 
 
Imported from Bengal, raw jute was manufactured into a coarse cloth used in 
sacking, bags and related products and sold in markets across the world for the 
transport of the products central to the ‘first great globalization’.11 By the early 
twentieth century the strong global demand for these products led to the rise of output 
in a range of European states (especially Germany) and the USA. The simplicity of 
the product and the unsophisticated technology used in its manufacture gave a huge 
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competitive advantage to low wage producers, and this meant above all the area 
around Calcutta, where Scottish money, management and expertise had helped to 
create a machine industry capable of competing in world markets. By the 1890s 
Calcutta’s output overtook that of Dundee, and the two cities dominated world trade 
in the product (neither industry at this stage sold very much in the home market of 
their rival). 
 
The strength of responses to this competition in juteopolis waxed and waned, 
partly depending upon the state of the trade cycle, which had a particularly large 
impact in jute. From the 1880s the local Chamber of Commerce debated protectionist 
solutions, though as the competition in jute products was largely confined to third 
country markets, the likely efficacy of such a policy was unclear.12 Alternatives 
debated included the alignment of Indian with British Factory Acts, to try and force 
up wage costs in Calcutta.13  
 
As in many British industrial cities, so in Dundee, the predominant liberalism 
of the mid-nineteenth century came under pressure as the staple export trades 
encountered growing competition in that century’s last decades.14 Across the country 
there was much talk of economic ‘decline’, in many respects exaggerated, but which 
nevertheless for many called into question commitment to free trade.15  However, 
while many industrial employers moved to Conservative positions, and the 
Conservatives moved towards protectionism, liberalism as a political force remained 
predominant in most industrial parts of the country. This was the case in Dundee. 
Ever since the 1832 Reform Act Dundee had had Liberal MPs (two from 1868), and 
though a Labour MP was elected for the first time in 1906, he was, as noted above, 
very much of a ‘Lib-Lab’ disposition. 
 
So when Churchill won Dundee for the first time in 1908 the city was already 
suffering from a long-run trend of rising Indian competition, and at the time of the 
election the jute industry was also in one of its periodic depressed stages.  Despite this 
context, Churchill’s approach to the election emphasized the continuing case for free 
trade. A pamphlet made up of his election speeches made clear use of traditional 
rhetoric about protection threatening to ‘allow people for private profit to impose 
taxation upon bread and meat’ which ‘will cheat and starve your children’.  In his 
final speech he declaimed ‘You know what would be the result of a Tory tariff reform 
victory…corruption at home, aggression to cover it abroad; the trickery of tariff 
juggles; the tyranny of a wealth-fed party machine; sentiment by the bucketful—
patriotism and Imperialism by the Imperial pint…Dear food for the millions, cheap 
labour for the millionaire…’.16   
 
The tone of the Liberal campaign was as much anti-Tory as anti-Labour, 
focussed on defending free trade, but also on the need for social reform.17 Two days 
before the election the Liberal government legislated for Old Age Pensions (as well as 
abolishing the Sugar duty) and this chimed with the Liberal claim that social reform 
could be funded from the proceeds of economic expansion, without recourse to tariffs. 
Churchill himself offered broad support for social reform in the election, defending 
the Liberal record on the Trade Disputes Act (which protected trade union action) and 
pensions, but offering little in the way of specific promises. 18 
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Churchill’s need for a new parliamentary seat had been brought about by his move 
from Colonial Under-Secretary to President of the Board of Trade.19 It was in the 
latter role that he was to play a significant role in the ‘New Liberal’ social reforms. 
The Board of Trade had a broad responsibility for the labour market, and Churchill 
was to be important in the passage of the legislation on Labour Exchanges, National 
Insurance, and Trade Boards which set minimum wages in some ‘sweated industries. 
There are divergent views about the extent and depth of Churchill’s support for these 
policies, but there is no doubt that this was the period in his career when he was most 
concerned with social reform. 20  
 
In the current context it was the support for Trade Boards that is most 
significant, given their later importance in the jute industry. On the face of it these 
represented the most direct assault on liberal economic principles, giving a state body 
the ability to determine wages. 21 At the time, however, the scope of these Boards was 
very carefully circumscribed, Churchill stressing that ‘these methods of regulating 
wages by law are only defensible as exceptional measures to deal with diseased or 
parasitic trades’.22 These arguments were to be returned to in the very different 
circumstances of the war and post-war problems of the jute industry, a discussion 
returned to in section IV. 
 
     II 
 
Juteopolis always did well in wartime. After an initial dislocation, it had 
flourished during the American Civil War, as jute (and linen) goods were in strong 
demand for tents, waggon coverings and sandbags as well as peace-time uses in bags 
and sacking. Similarly in the First War, after initial slack trade following the 
declaration of war, the industry flourished mightily; as the local Year Book noted of 
1915 ‘Dundee can hardly hope to have another year of such unmixed prosperity’.23 
For 1916 the summary was ‘…a year of richest prosperity to the staple trades of 
Dundee and district’.24 Above all, it was the demand for sandbags that drove this 
boom, with demand rising from less than a quarter of a million per month to over 40 
million in the course of 1915.25 
 
This initial boom was succeeded by a period of continuing strong demand but 
increasing constraints on supply, both of raw jute and of labour. Raw material 
imports, which had averaged 200,000 tons per annum in the last pre-war decade, rose 
to 295,000 in 1915, but then fell back to a low of 82,000 in 1917. 26 This fall followed 
the imposition of controls aimed at limiting demand for shipping.27 Labour shortages 
reflected the opening-up of alternative employment opportunities as well as 
mobilisation into the forces for male workers. For women, who made up the majority 
of the jute labour force, there were some alternatives in munitions factories, plus some 
hard-fought access to previous male preserves such as on the trams and trains.28 
Labour supply was supplemented by a considerable influx of workers previously in 
the war-disruptedfishing industry. The striking overall feature of the jute labour 
market was the strength of demand.  
 
The unsurprising consequence of this level of demand was upward pressure on 
pay levels, with strikes as employers tried to resist labour’s demands, though 
conceding an underlying upward trend in nominal wage levels.29 In these conditions 
the main union of jute workers, the Dundee and District Union of Jute and Flax 
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Workers (DDUJFW), flourished, doubling its membership between August 1917 and 
August 1918 to reach twenty thousand.30 Another feature of changes common across 
the wartime UK was the support of state agencies for labour in some aspects of their 
disputes with employers. In the Dundee case this was most evident in the Ministry of 
Labour’s support for the union in its disagreements with jute employers about how to 
respond to the limits on production brought about by shortages of raw material. The 
employers wanted to do this by reducing the workforce by redundancies, but with the 
Ministry’s backing the Union’s alternative plan of short-time working prevailed.31 
 
The wartime strengthening of local trade unionism in the city was matched by 
the strengthening of the jute employers. In 1918 they formed the Association of Jute 
Spinners and Manufacturers (AJSM), and this became a highly effective bargaining 
body, not only in relation to the unions, but also in discussion with government bodies 
that from the war onwards were to play a much bigger role in the industry.32 These 
shifting circumstances had no immediate impact on the parliamentary politics of the 
City. Churchill, having been comfortably re-elected in the two general elections of 
1910, was then faced with an election contest during the war, in August 1917, and in 
defiance of the electoral truce, when he became Minister of Munitions.33 The election 
was contested by the prominent local prohibitionist and pacifist figure, Edwin 
Scrymgeour, who had stood unsuccessfully in all previous Dundee elections back to 
1908. 
 
Churchill won a convincing victory by 7302 votes to 2036, albeit on a turnout 
of only 43 per cent.34 The election debate focussed on the war, with Scrymgeour’s 
advocacy of a negotiated peace leading Churchill to compare him with Lenin.35 
Though Scrymgeour was a socialist, he got no support from the official Labour party, 
locally or nationally, whilst Churchill was able to claim the support of both Unionists 
and Labour.36   On the other hand, Scrymgeour undoubtedly did articulate the 
opposition to Churchill amongst elements of the labour movement in Dundee. Most 
importantly, he was supported by John Sime, the Secretary of the DDUJFW, and the 
single most important trade union figure in the city. For Sime, Churchill was ‘one of 
the last men who will do anything for the working classes, unless they compel him by 
vigorous action to do so’, and he cited as an example Churchill’s failure to support the 
case for having jute declared a protected occupation.37     
 
 
     III 
 
In the war’s immediate aftermath the jute industry moved quickly into contraction as 
wartime demand dried-up.  There was also recognition that the resumption of peace 
was likely to revive competition, not least from India, where the wartime industry had 
boomed, aided by the diversion of British production from exports to war uses. In the 
face of these expected problems debate over the future of the industry down to 1922 
was dominated by two issues—trade protection and minimum wage regulation. Both 
of these were key issues for New Liberalism, and are explored in turn. 
 
Nationally, the war had led to a considerable strengthening of protectionist 
sentiment, and this was also evident in Dundee.  For example, the pre-war idea of a 
preferential export duty on Bengal’s raw jute was revived at the Dundee Chamber of 
Commerce in 1916.38  This proposal was returned to by the jute employers as the war 
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drew to a close, in evidence given to the Government-appointed committee on the 
position of textiles after the War. 39 Such plans had clearly been given a fillip by anti-
German sentiment, as Germany had been a major jute manufacturer before 1914. This 
strategic approach to trade was to feed into what came to be called ‘Safeguarding’, the 
idea that certain industries should be protected because of their centrality to war-
making.40 
 
Also in the last months of the war a committee was set up jointly by the AJSM 
and trade unions to look at ways ‘to expand the industry after the war’. 41 This was the 
first time that the two sides of the industry had come together in such a way, though it 
should be noted that this was far from suggesting harmonious industrial relations in 
the industry, where a significant strike was occurring in the later months of the war 
over the length of the working week. 42 It was against this background that the 
campaign for the December 1918 election was fought.  Churchill stood on the 
Coalition ticket, ‘the ‘Coupon’, and was not opposed by the Unionists.43 At the core 
of the election debate was the likely nature of the post-war settlement with Germany, 
and Churchill in his election address emphasized that it was not ‘the time for putting 
forward elaborate programmes of political and social reform’.44 
 
The Coalition with the Conservatives, which had become a thoroughly 
protectionist party, was plainly a problem for Liberal free traders. Churchill brought 
to this issue a long-standing, deep-rooted commitment to free trade. 45  In his election 
speeches he sought to play down the significance of the issue, talking of the mandate 
of the government to make minor protectionist measures, and the case for preference 
only on existing duties: ‘It is not a question of Free Trade or Protection. It is a 
question of getting our daily bread’.46 But this was to be a recurrent source of tension 
over the remainder of his time in Dundee, with the local Liberal Association unhappy 
with any slippage from complete free trade.   When, in the run-up to 1922, calls for an 
independent Liberal candidate were pressed, one of the criticisms of Churchill and the 
Coalition was support for Safeguarding, though Churchill vigorously defended this 
policy, arguing that ‘The Safeguarding of Industries Act arises directly from the 
resolutions proposed at the Paris conference of 1916 by Mr Asquith and Mr 
Runciman. It in no way affects the general principle of Free Trade’.47  Pressed by 
employers on the issue of Indian competition, Churchill stressed that he was a free 
trader, and avoided answering directly a question about a preferential export duty on 
raw jute, asserting only that ‘we must have all the raw material we require before 
those who caused all this trouble got their share’.48  
 
The 1918 election saw a sweeping national victory for the Coalition, and 
Churchill was returned with his largest majority, along with Wilkie, albeit on only a 
47 per cent turnout.49 The Unionists did not put up a separate candidate, Scrymgeour 
stood again as a Prohibitionist, and James Brown, the President of the Dundee Trades 
Council, stood for Labour. 50 Local issues, above all about the future of jute, had 
figured in the campaign although Churchill’s somewhat fudged responses were 
clearly not an obstacle to his re-election. But the condition of the industry soon came 
into sharper focus in the early months of 1919, as the industry’s slump continued, and 
the AJSM successfully approached the trade unions to make a joint approach to the 
government in London on the surge in imports of Indian jute manufactures.51 
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The route to getting such joint action was by no means straightforward. This 
was partly because of wrangling over union representation, with the DDUJFW hostile 
to involvement of the Dundee Factory and Mill Operatives Union (DFMOU), an 
organization led by a clergyman and regarded by other Dundee unions as not a real 
trade union. More important than this was the ambivalence of the DDUJFW about 
what should be done in response to Indian competition. While the AJSM in 1919 was 
pressing the case for ‘stopping’ Indian imports, the union offered only ‘general 
support’ for something to be done.52 
 
Responding to the statement made by the employers prior to the London 
meeting the DDUJFW emphasized that ‘it must not be assumed we agree with all the 
statements put forward by the employers on the question of Indian competition’. The 
unions tended to put more emphasis on the question of raising the wages and 
conditions of Indian workers. Thus, Sime suggested bringing in George Barnes as the 
government minister responsible for international labour conditions and the 
contemporary discussions with the International Labour Office. 53 But the AJSM view 
was that discussion of wages in India was beside the point: ‘such alterations of wages 
and hours in Calcutta would have no material effect, and what was more important, 
would have no immediate effect’.54 
 
While these discussions were going on the DCC was continuing its pursuit of 
a preferential duty on the export of raw jute. It saw this issue as needing to be 
separated from the issue of Calcutta competition with Dundee: it was ‘not a purely 
parochial matter’.55 When they met the President of the Board of Trade they agreed 
with him that what they were looking for was a duty to be used for bargaining 
purposes. But as he pointed out, if it was used in this way Britain’s access to foreign 
raw materials might be threatened and he noted that  ‘we might come the most 
appalling ”cropper” in Lancashire if we dealt very lightheartedly with jute’.56 
Thereafter the issue seems to have been shelved. 
 
At the meeting with the AJSM and DFMOU, Churchill stated that ‘the 
problem appeared to him to be one of extreme difficulty, as any form of prohibition in 
this case would be against one of the Dependencies of the Empire, and further, any 
form of protection would be against the Free Trade principles of the Government. 
Although he was a strong advocate of Free Trade, he was not prepared to say that 
some modification of Free Trade principles would not be necessary to overcome 
circumstances, such as had arisen in the jute trade’. But his practical suggestion was 
limited to the setting-up of a Royal Commission.57 
 
The following week another meeting at the Board of Trade involved the main 
trade unions, including the DDUJFW. Sime reiterated the call for a commission of 
enquiry, stressing the severity of the crisis, and ‘If nothing was done Dundee would 
drop from its status as the third city in Scotland and become of no more importance 
than Montrose’. While the enquiry was underway Sime called for government control 
of the jute industry in both Dundee and Calcutta. On protection Sime ‘did not suggest 
that imports should be restricted permanently, but until a proper solution was found 
restriction of imports of jute goods should be imposed’. 58 
 
In response to these meetings, the Board of Trade announced a  committee of 
enquiry, which would start work in Dundee at the end of May.59 When this committee  
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reported in December its conclusions were very clear against protection. The 
Committee presented import restrictions as the proposal of the employers, and 
rejected this idea as ‘impracticable’: ‘The committee are unable to recommend 
artificial means to enable the United Kingdom to compete with another portion of the 
Empire’. 60 
 
Turning to the unions’ proposals for equalizing competition between Dundee 
and Calcutta either by raising wages in India to Scottish levels, or imposing the same 
conditions as under the British Factory Acts, the report deemed these were neither 
practicable, nor likely to be effective. Wages in India were such that Dundee had to 
accept a significant loss of markets in the lower quality goods, and the only solution 
for Dundee was to ‘concentrate on the finer grade of goods and specialities not made 
by the Indian mills’.61  
 
In making its report the committee noted that, since the spring, conditions in 
the industry had markedly improved, though it recognised this improvement was 
unlikely to be permanent. However, across Britain, 1919/1920 was a boom period of 
post-war ‘re-stocking’, and Dundee participated in that, helped also by specific factors 
relating to the appreciation of the rupee reducing Calcutta’s competitive edge.62 As 
was to be expected there was disappointment amongst the jute employers at the 
committee’s report, but its effect was to kill the issue of protectionism in Dundee jute 
for the time being.63 For the next year the industry and the city were to enjoy a period 
of relative prosperity that dampened the search for responses to the industry’s 
problems. 
 
     IV 
 
Trade Boards were a key feature of the New Liberal legislation under the pre-
war Liberal government.64  The number of workers affected was quite small, and the 
extent of the impact on these disputed, but for proponents the law marked the 
establishment of a new principle. The historian R. H.Tawney, who was actively 
involved in the calls for such intervention, cited the laws as a rejection ‘of the 
doctrine, held for three generations with almost religious intensity, that wages should 
be settled, as it was said by free competition alone, is one of the most remarkable 
changes in economic opinion which has taken place in the last hundred years…’.65 
On the other hand, the measure was supported by most Conservatives on paternalist 
grounds, seeing at as focussed only on assisting those who were unable to help 
themselves.66 The legislation faced almost no opposition in the House of Commons. 67 
 
Churchill, as President of the Board of Trade, was responsible for piloting the 
legislation through government and parliament. In commending the Bill to his Cabinet 
colleagues he stressed that the intervention would be limited to those trades where a 
majority of those in the trade supported legislation. He also insisted that the Boards 
would only be introduced in conditions where wages were exceptionally low, and 
there were conditions prejudicial to physical and social welfare…’there is no danger 
of such principles being unwittingly accepted as the normal basis of industry’.68  
Churchill defended this departure from traditional liberal policy, urging that ‘decent 
conditions make for industrial efficiency and increase rather than decrease 
competitive power’.69 
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The question of whether there should be a Trade Board in jute was raised at 
the time of the original legislation in 1909. One aspect of the drive for that regulation 
was the especially weak position of women workers, and the women’s trade union 
activist Mary McArthur had made the case for a Board in jute to protect workers who 
sewed sacks, who were usually women: ‘Mr Churchill, it was to be hoped, would not 
forget the jute workers, for not only was the jute trade one of the lowest paid of the 
staple trades of the Kingdom, but there was also a considerable amount of sack-
sewing, which was even worse paid than the jute trade’.70 There is no evidence that, at 
this time, the unions in jute pressed for a Board.71 
 
There is also no evidence of Churchill explicitly rejecting the case for jute’s 
inclusion at this time, but as noted above he was keen to emphasize the narrow scope 
of the proposed legislation: wages had to be ‘exceptionally low’ and ‘conditions 
prejudicial to physical and social welfare’.72  Civil Service comment on the proposal 
concentrated on its likely effect on bag sewers, work largely done at home by women, 
and suggesting ‘It is unpleasant work and therefore done by very wretched people. I 
don’t know that a Trade Board would be of any use; there are so many other forces at 
work to produce misery.’73 A proposal by the MP for Montrose, Robert Harcourt, to 
include jute and linen in the industries covered by Boards was opposed by the Dundee 
Chamber of Commerce, and subsequently dropped.74  
 
The scope of Trade Boards was widened during the war, and the legislation 
was extended in 1918. Where the original law had been fundamentally concerned 
with the level of wages, hence ‘Sweated Industries’, the extension, in line with early 
post-war thinking, focussed on the degree of organization of an industry.75  The idea 
of a Trade Board in jute resurfaced in August 1918, when Sime said he was surprised 
at the idea, given the high level of unionization in the industry, but welcomed the 
proposal. 76 The matter was under active discussion by the AJSM by November 1918, 
and their initial stance was surprisingly favourable, seeing it as a way of regulating 
wages at a time of exceptional industrial unrest. 77  Employers were assured by the 
Board of Trade that a Trade Board did not involve suggesting jute was a sweated 
industry, and further reassurance was offered that a minimum wage would not be set 
until conditions had settled down. 78 
 
The Board was established at the end of 1919, and set the first minimum wage 
in June 1920, co-inciding almost exactly with the peak of the post-war boom.79  In 
February 1921 the employers called simultaneously for a wage cut and the abolition 
of the Board, part of a co-ordinated push by employers against wage regulation, and 
part of the strong political drive for ‘de-control’.80 At this time the Union was still 
calling for a wage increase, but eventually, despite its opposition, a 12.5 per cent cut 
was agreed by the Board to take effect in September 1921 (further cuts followed down 
to 1923 81). Before that happened, in February  of that year, the AJSM approached the 
Board of Trade to press for abolition. Even when the September cut was secured, it 
regarded this as inadequate and pressed for further action, and succeeded in getting a 
further reduction agreed to take effect in February 1922. 82   
 
When the AJSM approached the Ministry of Labour on abolition they argued 
that the workers were well organised and didn’t need a Board to defend their interests, 
and that the present level of wages set by the Board was causing unemployment.83 
Senior figures in the Ministry took a robust view of the employers’ case. A 
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memorandum on the subject noted that the wages set by the jute Board were almost 
the lowest fixed by any Trade Board in the country, moreover, the document cited an 
expert’s view that ‘the simple fact is that there is no market whatever for the 
manufactured article, and that if wages were reduced to zero it would not affect the 
position in this respect at all’, and went on to say ‘it is clearly, therefore, an attempt of 
the employers to use the slump for breaking down the Trade Board system which, as 
almost the worst employers in the country, they have always resented’.84 
 
The rejection of the employers’ case by the Ministry, formally notified in 
April 1921, led them to approach Churchill in the summer of 1921, and in turn he 
approached the Ministry of Labour.85  In response to him, a senior official in the 
Board of Trade staunchly defended the Board’s role against the view that the industry 
was in principle one to which the legislation should not have been applied, and that its 
application was causing unemployment. On the first point, it was argued that even 
without the recent fresh legislation, jute would have fallen to be regulated under the 
1909 Act, as its wage levels showed it to be a sweated industry. On the second point, 
he stressed that the wages set by the Board were linked to changes in the cost of             
living, and that with the recent price fall a cut in wages was under consideration. The 
further argument was made that, in the absence of alternative local employments, the 
jute workers were in a very poor bargaining position, and therefore they and their 
unions needed a Board to have any effective power. Finally, it was asserted, the 
problems of the jute industry were of such a magnitude that a cut in wages of any 
plausible scale was unlikely to much affect the employment level.86 
 
The DDUJFW strongly resisted the call for abolition of the Board, and 
stressed not only the benefits to the workers, but also the previous willingness of the 
AJSM to use the Board to get agreement on difficult issues in the trade. It was clear to 
the union by this time that the deflation in the economy was going to lead to strong 
pressure from the employers for wage reductions.87 Churchill came out strongly in 
support of the employers’ case for abolishing the Board. Writing to the Prime 
Minister in September 1921, he said ‘as you will know, I was originally the author of 
this legislation, but over and again to Parliament I declared that it was to be confined 
to parasitic trades, and that not trade that was capable of forming an effective trade 
union should be subjected to this special and invidious control. The original bill has 
now been extended to all sorts of trades to which it is wholly unsuited, including the 
powerful Jute trade in Dundee’. He also argued against wage minima on the grounds 
that ‘the trade itself is under competition from India. The capital sunk in the Indian 
mills was not subject to the British income tax or Excess Profits Duty…Behind them 
stand relays of Indian labour capable of earning less than one third of the present 
wage scale’. 88 
 
Around the time of Churchill’s letter, the local Unionist newspaper, the 
Courier, mounted a vociferous and persistent campaign against the Trade Boards. 
Editorials on 3rd, 17th, 20th, and 29th of September 1921 supported the call for 
abolition. In the last of these the paper attacked the trade unions for their support of 
the Boards, charging that this was inconsistent with the unions professed concern with 
unemployment.89 The union position was complicated by Sime’s exclusion from the 
Board, because of alleged misbehaviour, but this did not undermine their support for 
the principle.90 In April 1922 the newspaper’s critical commentary continued, 
suggesting that the Cave Committee, which had reviewed the operation of the Trade 
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Boards, had all but recommended their abolition, and that the Board of Trade should 
now move to abolish them.91  An editorial close to the 1922 election, on 28th 
September, characteristically suggested that the Boards had ‘proved a complete and 
costly failure’, above all in increasing the level of unemployment. 
 
Unemployment was the key issue in Dundee in the early post-war years. After 
the post-war boom of 1919/20 it rose rapidly to a peak in the winter of 1921/22, 
reaching perhaps 30 per cent in the jute industry.92 Both the parliamentary and 
popular politics of unemployment, here as elsewhere in Britain, primarily focused not 
on its reduction, but the relief offered to those who suffered from its effects. In 
September 1921 Dundee saw a serious breakdown in public order as jute workers 
entitlement to National Insurance payments became exhausted, and the Parish Council 
announced it was unable to extend the operation of outdoor relief. 93 This kind of 
localised, rowdy street politics was to be increasingly eroded by the rise of national 
politics and campaigns, and unemployment relief was to become a ‘nationalised’ issue 
later in the inter-war period as Parishes and Poor Law Boards lost control of relief, 
partly as a response to the effectiveness of the local protests. 94  In Scotland, and in 
contradiction to the law, outdoor relief to the able-bodied was granted, and in late 
1921 central government had indemnified local Parish Councils against potential 
action by disgruntled rate payers.95 
 
This was not the first outbreak of unrest. In September 1919 Churchill had 
postponed a meeting in the City because of fears of such rowdiness interrupting his 
public meetings, and the following year similar issues were discussed between him 
and the Chairman of the Liberal Association, especially in relation to disturbances led 
by unemployed ex-service men.96 Partly because of the disruptive effects protests 
about unemployment had on the conduct of parliamentary politics in Dundee, 
Churchill was active behind the scenes on this issue. When Sir Montage Barlow 
reported to Churchill on the situation in the city later in 1920 the focus was still on 
unemployed ex-servicemen, for understandable political reasons. Barlow’s report fed 
into a Cabinet appointed committee on unemployment, which Churchill encouraged 
the creation of, and which explicitly discussed the situation in Dundee. 97 
 
But with the slump in 1921 the unemployment situation greatly deteriorated. 
By April of that year fears of unrest led Ritchie to advise Churchill against holding a 
public meeting in the city. In September, against the background of the protest against 
the Parish Council noted above, Churchill was again worrying about disruption to 
possible meetings.98 But he was also urging action by the Prime Minister on the 
unemployment issue. This was done in the same letter already cited in which 
Churchill attacked the jute Trade Board. It began by saying that ‘My discussions here 
have convinced me that there are very great grounds of complaint against the 
government’s policy on unemployment’. Again, ‘policy on unemployment’ meant 
policy on its relief, with Churchill arguing for an extension of National Insurance 
provision to avoid more of the unemployed becoming reliant on the Parish Councils 
(who were responsible for poor relief in Scotland until 1929). Churchill linked this to 
the Trade Board issue by claiming that the wages they set were a major cause of 
unemployment, and therefore the cost of their actions was falling on the public 
authorities responsible for unemployment relief.99 
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In this same letter Churchill asserted that ‘he certainly did not identify himself 
with the employer point of view’.100 But by opposing Trade Boards, Churchill had 
aligned himself clearly with the Unionist opposition and in clear contradiction to the 
position of the local trade unions. And while he was certainly active in encouraging a 
positive response to protests about unemployment relief, the very focus on this issue 
suggested a degree of giving-up on any policy to address the possibility of increasing 
employment or finding a way to ameliorate the jute industry’s plight. 
 
     V 
 
As shown in Table 1 the election of 1922 was a clear defeat for Churchill. 
 
(Table 1 Here). 
 
 
The victors were a Labour candidate, E.D.Morel, and the Prohibitionist, 
Edwin Scrymgeour, who was otherwise (broadly) a Labour supporter. These two 
represented diverse strands of the new combination that was underpinning the 
electoral growth of the Labour party.101 Morel was a cosmopolitan intellectual with no 
ties to Dundee, famous for his role in exposing the extraordinary excesses of King 
Leopold of Belgium’s rule in Africa, a founder of the Union of Democratic Control 
who had spent six months in prison for activities related to his opposition to the war. 
He had been a Liberal candidate for Birkenhead until his opposition to the war led to 
his resignation on December 1914, after which he moved increasingly towards the 
Labour party.102  
 
 Scrymgeour was a very well-known local man, a long-serving City 
councillor, whose prohibitionism (and abrasive Christianity) had complicated but not 
ultimately prevented him becoming accepted as a representative of the labour voice in 
Dundee, though not endorsed by the Labour party. In his idiosyncratic way he was 
undoubtedly part of the radical movement to the Left in Scotland, symbolised above 
all by ‘Red Clydside’. 103 The newspaper Scrymgeour edited, the Prohibitionist, 
celebrated the outcome of the 1922 election as both ‘Britain’s first Prohibitionist MP 
returned with a marvellous majority’ but also ‘Accompanied by Morel, thus achieving 
Labour’s double victory’.104 His peculiar appeal is suggested by the data we have 
from this dual-member constituency, which shows that over 5,000 of his voters were 
‘plumpers’-people who didn’t use their second vote, but gave one only to him.105 
 
The most detailed discussion of the immediate causes of this electoral 
outcome identified four ‘principal agencies of opposition to Churchill’ the ‘Dundee 
Irish, the Jute and Flax Worker’s Union, the Prohibition Party and, late on the scene, 
the Communist Party.’ 106 The Irish hostility to Churchill was linked to his prominent 
role in the battle over Irish independence leading up to the 1921 Treaty, and the 
widespread support in Dundee for the anti-Treaty Sinn Fein. Sufficient support to 
elect an MP made the Prohibition Party a Dundee peculiarity, though prohibitionism 
was a popular cause in Scotland in the 1920s. The Party may also have been important 
as a mobiliser of (newly-enfranchised) women, as we know women were 
disproportionately in favour of the teetotalist case.107 There was also the legacy of 
Churchill’s equivocations over the enfranchisement of women dating back to the early 
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1900s. In the Edwardian years he had ‘developed a very personal antipathy to 
women’s suffrage ever since the militants began interrupting his perorations’.108  
 
The strength of support for the newly-formed Communist party is notable, and 
reflected the strongest form of rejection of the old liberal political economy. The party 
was closely linked to the ‘street politics’ noted above, but while this may have gained 
it some support from those most hostile to ‘respectable’ parliamentary politics, it may 
also have meant that the working class vote was less divided than in 1931, when the 
Communist vote reached its peak at over 10,000. 109 
 
The DDUJFW’s position had hardened against Churchill, and this reflected his 
perceived indifference to the plight of the city, with Sime frequently arguing that 
Churchill paid little attention to his pleas for assistance.110 The basis of this claim, and 
the broader issue of Churchill’s alienation from the organised working class in the 
city, is returned to below.  But also important to Churchill’s loss of support was the 
division in Liberal and Conservative politics which helped to divide the vote on the 
anti-Labour side; what has been called ‘the utter disarray of the Right’.111  
 
Discontent over the fiscal stance of the Coalition was a recurrent feature of 
Churchill’s correspondence with Ritchie. As early as May 1919 Churchill was 
complaining to him ‘least of all do I think there is good ground for complaint from 
Liberals in regard to the Budget, which lays its only increase of taxation on alcoholic 
liquors and death duties.  I regard, and have always regarded, the giving of Preference 
to the Dominions on existing duties as a very small matter so long as there is no 
question of the protective or preferential taxation of food’.112 
 
These two linked issues—taxation and protectionism-were key to a growing 
wedge between Churchill and the Liberals in Dundee.  While the Coalition eventually 
launched a major reduction of public spending (‘the Geddes Axe’), ‘old-style’ 
Liberals wanted action sooner and sharper.113  And, as noted already, belief that the 
Tories’ protectionist instincts were not being sufficiently resisted was a recurrent 
source of contention. Churchill’s political tactics were clear long before the 1922 
election. Writing to Ritchie in September 1920 about speeches during a forthcoming 
visit to Dundee he wrote ‘My object, of course, will be to promote the unity of anti-
socialist forces, and I shall be glad of any facts which will give me guidance as to the 
local situation in regard to this’.114  
 
In summer 1921 he welcomed the selection of a second (pro-Coalition) liberal, 
Macdonald, urging ‘We ought at an early date in the Autumn to have a joint meeting 
at which Mr MacDonald and I would both be present. The lines of cleavage against 
the two Bolshevik and Labour candidates could then be clearly drawn’.115  Churchill’s 
focus on the menace of socialism was also a bone of contention with lots of Dundee 
Liberals, many of whom regarded the Conservatives as the bigger enemy, with their 
espousal of protectionism. Their fears were clearly justified, as Churchill  by early 
1922 was in correspondence with the Dundee Unionist Association, extolling not only 
the virtues of the Coalition, but also floating the idea of a new National Party, for 
which anti-socialism would be the foundation. 116  
 
Key problems of Churchill’s stance can be seen in the politics of his running 
mate. MacDonald was a strong supporter of retrenchment, and urged on Churchill the 
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need to emphasize this in trying to maintain Liberal support.117  While he was allied 
with Churchill, his enthusiasm for retrenchment made him seem like an old-fashioned 
Liberal, happily and explicitly embracing the slogan of ‘Peace, Retrenchment and 
Reform’. For him, retrenchment would involve, for example, an end to National 
Insurance against unemployment, leaving this provision to trade unions and friendly 
societies. But while this could be seen as extremely conservative positioning, he also 
prioritised retrenchment over anti-socialism, regarding the Conservatives as the real 
obstacle to retrenchment.118 By contrast, while also emphasizing retrenchment, 
Churchill argued this was one of the big issues upon which Unionist and Liberals 
were united. 119 
 
This confusing amalgam of policy and polemical stances was accompanied in 
the months leading up to the election by organizational problems amongst Liberals in 
Dundee. Ritchie died in late 1921, to be succeeded as President by Joseph Philip. 
Philip resigned in April 1922, to be succeeded by J.C Robertson. Churchill never 
established the degree of accord with the local Liberals that had existed with Ritchie 
in post. More obvious was the split in Liberal ranks over their attitude to the Coalition 
and to Churchill. In the summer of 1922 a vote on whether to support his candidature 
was passed by 81 votes to 41. Those in the minority formed a Dundee Liberals 
Committee, motivated especially by hostility to Safeguarding and government 
extravagance. They brought in an Independent Liberal candidate, Robert 
Pilkington.120  
 
The 1922 election in Dundee was a spectacle of ‘mutual and unedifying 
bitterness’, in which characteristics much of the running was made by Churchill and 
his allies on the one side, and the Communists on the other.121 Churchill’s tactic was 
to patronise Scymgeour as honest but deluded, but treat Morel as a crypto-
Communist: ’Mr. Gallacher is only Mr Morel with the courage of his convictions.’ 122 
This line of polemic may be seen as being as miscalculated as Churchill’s famous 
speech in the 1945 election, linking a Labour government to the Gestapo. Not only 
was Morel a long way from being a Communist, as Lenin recognised in characteristic 
terms: ’Morel is a bourgeois, whose talk about peace and disarmament is a lot of 
empty phrases’.123  But attempting to label him as such showed how far out of touch 
Churchill was with the local popularity of someone whose long history of anti-
militarism, including six months in prison for his anti-war activities, had considerable 
resonance in the city.124 
                
     VI 
 
By disrupting international trade the First World War accelerated the industrial 
development of poor countries, especially in Asia, significantly changing the 
international division of labour.  Textiles were at the core of this shift.125 Mmost 
significant for Britain was the upsurge of Indian manufacturing, reflecting the key 
role of textile production in that country.126 Cottonwas central to the shift, with the 
loss of Britain’s market share in the Indian market the single most dramatic, 
immediate commercial consequence of the War.127 While a much smaller industry, 
the effects of the war on jute were, even more striking, with Dundee’s home market 
being entered by Indian producers on a substantial scale for the first time.  
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This wartime disruption was not to a pattern which had previously been 
unchanging. Indian producers had been making gains at their British competitor’s 
expense in both cotton and jute well before the war, though in the former case a loss 
of market share was compatible with a continuing absolute increase in trade. In jute, , 
total output faltered even before 1914.128 Bby disrupting shipping and raw material 
supply as well as production and sale of the final product, the war fundamentally 
shifted the relative position of Dundee and Calcutta, and henceforth the former was 
never going to recover. 
 
At their broadest these changes involved a profound challenge to the whole 
architecture of the international economy, and especially Britain’s pre-eminent role 
within it. The gold standard and free trade regime were now under pressure as never 
before. These issues were to dominate the national economic policy agenda until the 
crisis of 1931 radically undermined them both. 129 But alongside this new 
macroeconomic fragility were the particular problems of those industries and areas 
most affected.130 All of the old export ‘staples’ were in serious difficulty, but, as 
suggested above, jute was exceptional in the degree and urgency of its difficulties, 
combined with the peculiar problem of penetration of the home market by a low-wage 
producer. This was the context for the politics of Dundee.  
 
Looking back from 1930 Churchill argued that great change had come over 
public life with the war, ‘the issues are not political; they are economic…what (the 
nation) now asks for is more money, better times, regular employment, expanding 
comfort, and material prosperity’.131 In that light, what seems clear is how far 
Churchill’s approach to Dundee in the four years after the war failed to offer any 
coherent vision of how prosperity might be restored in Dundee. 
 
On the question of competition with Calcutta in jute, Churchill largely stuck to 
the norms of pre-war Liberalism and its foundational commitment to free trade, albeit 
he was willing to concede a small amount of ground to the imperatives of 
Safeguarding. In a speech in April 1922 he argued that ‘The old disputes of Free 
Trade and Protectionists had no application to present conditions. It was not foreign 
imports or foreign competition that was injuring this country as a whole, though to a 
certain extent foreign competition was injuring Dundee. It was the failure of our 
export trade owing to the collapse of foreign markets.’132 In fact, foreign competition 
was harming Dundee more than ‘to a certain extent.’  Protectionism would have been 
at best only a limited help, but in the crisis circumstances of the early post-war years 
Churchill’s unwillingness to respond positively to the DDUJFW’s call for some 
action on this front was one important step in alienating trade union opinion. As we 
have seen, there was, at least briefly in 1919, some chance of building on joint 
employer-trade union pressure on this issue, but the moment was allowed to pass.133  
 
Ironically, both Morel and Scrymgeour were anti-protectionists, and showed 
no sign of following the (equivocal) deviation by the main jute union into the 
protectionist camp. Before the war Morel had been a strong proponent of free trade, 
like most Victorian radicals believing it was the route to international peace. In 
addition, his work on the Congo led him to believe that free trade between free men 
was the best route to development in Africa.134  However, Morel is typical of those on 
the Left who, as Trentmann emphasizes, stuck largely to anti-protectionism, but 
ceased to see free trade as any kind of panacea, and started to talk about the need for 
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trade ‘regulation’.135 What Morel certainly didn’t do, unlike Churchill, was put 
forward free trade as part of a conservative programme of retrenchment, following the 
old Liberal logic that in the absence of tariffs for revenue, sound policy required tight 
limits on public spending lest the weight of other taxes (especially on income) placed 
an unacceptable burden on the citizenry.  
 
Churchill was right that the meaning of Free Trade had shifted. For most 
people on the Left, it had become even more of a political issue, closely linked to  
pacific attitudes to international relations. Conversely, it had become less significant 
as an economic issue in the pre-war form of a guarantor of cheap food. 136  In Dundee, 
as elsewhere in wartime Britain, a new politics of consumption had arisen, often 
spearheaded by women, and taking both official and unofficial forms.137  This had 
focussed attention much more on state regulation as the route to cheaper and more 
adequate supplies of food with, as Trentmann suggests, milk as the commodity 
typically focussed upon. 138 The Dundee Food Control committee was established in 
August 1917 and was consistently under pressure from Labour and Co-operative 
interests in the city about its alleged failure to adequately control prices.139  
 
For Churchill, on the other hand, advocacy of free trade seemed to have little 
relationship to his assertive international stance, not least on Russia, where his attitude 
had alienated working class support far beyond the Communist party. On the Left 
also, free trade was combined with support for improving wages and conditions of 
jute workers in Calcutta. 140  However Utopian this strategy may have been (and 
impractical as a way of dealing with Dundee jute’s problems), it detached free trade 
from the conservative trappings it acquired after 1918 in the hands of Churchill and 
his allies.  
 
When Morel first accepted the candidacy for Dundee in 1920, he emphasized 
that his focus of attacks on Churchill would be foreign policy.141 This issue certainly 
dominated his campaign. But he linked foreign policy explicitly to Dundee’s 
economic difficulties, arguing that the instability of the world was encouraged by 
Churchillian-style belligerence, which in turn reduced trade and hence employment in 
export industries such as jute.142 
 
 
As noted above, when in September 1921 Churchill wrote to Lloyd George 
criticising Trade Boards he linked this explicitly to Indian competition. But while 
clearly characterising Indian competition as ‘unfair’, Churchill suggested no remedy 
for this problem, beyond wage reductions in Dundee. 143 Churchill’s position was 
certainly not born out of any sympathy for the efforts of India to industrialize; he was 
especially opposed to allowing such efforts to be aided by tariffs. In 1919, as part of 
his resistance to any idea of greater self-rule for India, he wrote ‘It seems to me 
monstrous that India should be allowed to put on a protective tariff against British 
goods while Britain herself remains a free trade country’.144 
 
The politics of the Trade Board issue were more straightforward than those of 
free trade. Here it was a case where Churchill lined himself up with employer and 
conservative forces, and against the explicit support of the unions for the continuation 
of the Board, a support endorsed by Morel and Scrymgeour.  The political issue here 
was not just the immediately compelling one of trying to find a mechanism to support 
17 
 
the wages of Dundonians against the bargaining power of the employers, in the 
context of a slump. More broadly, the extension of Trade Boards was part of the 
wartime advance of in the bargaining power of workers that, unsurprisingly, 
organized labour regarded as the fruits of their commitment to the war effort, and this 
made their significance extend beyond their (problematic) practical effects in 
sustaining wage levels. 
 
Overall, Churchill had nothing to offer on the economic issues facing 
juteopolis. While he was willing to work to ease the pressure on the local authority to 
pay unemployment relief, for the jute industry itself he could only offer support for 
the employers’ drive to end the wage board  and allow unconstrained wage cuts. He 
opposed protectionism, and when doing so made the understandable but unhelpful 
comment in a meeting with the jute unions, that ‘where competition was between 
peoples living under wholly different modes of life, Government would have to 
formulate principles of equity and economy for regulating such competition; these 
principles were not at present apparent to him’. 145   
 
This was counsel of despair in the face of the shifting international division of 
labour. But this was the kind of shift that free trade doctrine had never anticipated. As 
Peter Clarke has pointed out, as far back as the Tariff Reform controversy, in 1903, 
Churchill had recognised that international competition would force shifts in activity 
in ‘old industrial countries’ like Britain. Echoing Alfred Marshall’s analysis, he had 
asserted that it was under free trade ‘where readjustment of labour and redistribution 
of capital are more easy, where enterprise is more varied and elastic’ that the best 
results could be expected. But for both Churchill and Marshall the context for such 
analysis was competition from countries such as Germany and the USA, a slow 
encroachment on British producers by other sophisticated industrial nations. Such 
understandings were of little help when competition was from low-wage producers, 
and in parts of Britain where the idea of a ready transition to what Churchill called 
‘the more complicated and secondary processes of manufacture’ was so remote.146  
 
As Clarke suggests, and as was to be so clearly demonstrated during his tenure 
as Chancellor of the Exchequer between 1924 and 1929, Churchill’s economic ideas 
had been formed in the late-Victorian/Edwardian heyday of the unmanaged economy 
and had limited purchase on the economic problems of Britain after 1918.147 This was 
particularly evident in relation to Dundee, which had become an unwitting victim of a 
shift in the international division of labour. There were no easy remedies for this 
situation, and Churchill’s bafflement is understandable. But the positions he did take 
in response to these problems, and the baggage they carried with them, were in 
retrospect almost designed to alienate the organized working-class electors of the city. 
 
Churchill’s political trajectory from pre-war Liberal to soon-to-be 
Conservative had, of course, its idiosyncracies. But the problems he faced in Dundee 
were an extreme form of those generally faced by Liberals in post-1918 Britain. 
Collapse of staple export industries rendered the pre-war Liberal combination of free 
trade and inexpensive social reform unsustainable. Whilst on the socialistic left there 
was beginning a painful and prolonged shift away from free trade and liberal 
internationalism towards a ‘National Political Economy’, liberal political economy in 
this period showed little sign of coming to grips with the new economic realities.148 
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